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I. INTRODUCTION
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act'
covers 800,000' employees, only 270,000' of whom are longshoremen and
harbor workers. The rest are District of Columbia workers,4 civilian
employees at military bases outside of the United States,5 employees of
federal contractors outside of the United States, 6 employees under the
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. 33 U.S.C. ch. 18 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. This act has been
amended by Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct. 27, 1972) [hereinafter referred to as the Amend-
ments].
2. HOUSE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1972).
3. Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
4. District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 612, 45 Stat. 600 (1928).
5. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-54 (1970) (enacted as Act of Aug. 16, 1941,
ch. 357, § 1, 55 Stat. 622).
6. War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06, 1711-17 (1970) (enacted as
Act of Dec. 2, 1942, ch. 668, 56 Stat. 1028).
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,7 and certain employees of nonap-
propriated fund instrumentalities of the Armed Forces. 8 This comment
will be primarily concerned with longshoremen and harbor workers and
their status under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
Traditionally, longshoring has been one of the more hazardous oc-
cupations in the United States. This is probably due to the everchanging
and unfamiliar work area in which the longshoreman does his daily labor
-the ship. The longshoreman's employer, the stevedoring company,
usually does not own or maintain the work area, hence the stevedore has
difficulty providing its employees with a safe place to work. While there
are safety standards for ships constructed and sailed under the United
States flag,' more than 80 percent of the ships loaded and unloaded by
longshoremen fly foreign flags.'" These foreign hulls have been charac-
terized by labor spokesmen as "difficult to work on" and as "unsafe from
top to bottom."" It is no wonder, then, that in 1971 longshoremen and
harbor workers reported 68,464 injuries under the Act.' 2 However, de-
spite poor working conditions, the accident frequency in longshoring
operations has decreased steadily,'" while accident insurance costs have,
just as steadily, risen.' 4 This paradox has been caused, according to ship-
ping industry representatives, by a legal dilemma called "the third party
circular liability law suit."
In the typical "third party circular liability law suit," a longshore-
man employed by a stevedore is injured aboard ship due to a deficient
condition on board the vessel either created by the stevedore or allowed
to exist by the stevedore's negligence. This deficient condition makes
the vessel unseaworthy.'5 The injured party collects compensation as his
exclusive remedy against his employer;' 6 but he also sues the shipowner
as a third party tortfeasor.17 At this point, the shipowner can either im-
plead' 8 the injured party's stevedore-employer or await a judgment and
go against him for indemnification.'9 The stevedore becomes responsible
7. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970) (enacted as Act of
Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462).
8. Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171-73 (1970) (enacted
as Act of June 19, 1952, ch. 444, § 2, 66 Stat. 139).
9. See 46 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1972).
10. Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 670 (1972).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 127.
13. Id. at 287.
14. Id. at 288.
15. Unseaworthiness is defined as a breach of the shipowner's absolute duty "to furnish
a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a) (Oct. 27, 1972).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 15 (Oct. 27, 1972). This
section preserves the injured longshoreman's right to bring a lawsuit against a third party.
18. FIED. R. Civ. P. 14.
19. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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to the shipowner for breach of an implied or express warranty to per-
form stevedoring services in a safe manner.3 In this way the circle is
closed and the injured party recovers indirectly that which he could not
recover directly from his employer. Double recovery, however, is not
allowed, as the longshoreman must reimburse the stevedore for the com-
pensation paid him. 1 Yet the stevedore ends up paying the injured long-
shoreman, through the "agency" of the ship, a much greater amount
than he would have been liable for under the Compensation Act, for the
measure of damages is much higher in a third party suit than under the
Act.
It is not difficult to see why "circular liability law suits" have be-
come the hottest issue in the maritime law of personal injury. The in-
dustry has had to shoulder a heavy financial burden in terms of legal
fees and insurance costs; but who can say that an industry able to spread
the misery cost of its injured workers to the public at large is not in a
better position to bear the financial loss than the injured worker himself?
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amend-
ments of 19722 were designed to curtail circular liability while increas-
ing compensation under the act to the injured party. Hopefully, this
trade-off will ease the burdens of both employer and employee and re-
establish the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
as a viable piece of legislation.
II. HISTORY OF THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
The necessity for a federal compensation scheme for injured long-
shoremen23 and harbor workers 24 first arose in 1917. Prior to that date
they had been covered by state compensation acts. But the Supreme
Court of the United States changed the status quo by drawing a fine
distinction between workers injured on the docks, and workers injured
on or over the navigable waters of the United States. In 1917, the Court
decided Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,"5 which held the workmen's com-
pensation law of New York inapplicable to a situation in which a New
York longshoreman was killed on a gangway, suspended 10 feet over
navigable waters, connecting the pier and the ship he was helping to
20. Id.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 15 (Oct. 27, 1972);
Seaboard Marine Serv. Corp. v. Quigley, 159 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d
822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 830 (1959).
22. Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct. 27, 1972).
23. A longshoreman is a workman who participates in the loading and unloading of
ships. His duties may call for his presence on board the ship, on land, or in between. The
longshoreman is employed by the stevedore company, which contracts his services.
24. A harbor worker is a workman who works repairing, painting, and doing other like
jobs on board ship, on the dock, or in between.
25. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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unload. The Court's main reason for denying compensation coverage
under the New York law was to further uniformity in United States
maritime law. Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the majority, stated: /
If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports
to such obligations as those imposed by her Compensation
Statute, other states may do likewise. The necessary conse-
quence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect
to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to
establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and
with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and im-
peded.2 6
In addition, the Jensen majority also held that the imposition of a
state workmen's compensation remedy fell without the "saving to suit-
ors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 178927 because workman's compensa-
tion acts were not remedies known at common law. The "saving to suit-
ors" clause excepts from the exclusive maritime jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts all suits for which the common law gave a remedy
irrespective of admiralty law.28 As workmen's compensation was not a
common law remedy, it could not be applied in a case governed by
admiralty law. It would appear, however, from the pervasive federalist
tone of Jensen, that that decision was prompted more by Congress' power
to regulate commerce2 9 than by the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts.8" Often, it seems, decisions rendered in the name of
admiralty jurisdiction would better be viewed as based upon the com-
merce clause.8'
In response to Jensen, Congress expanded the "savings clause" to
exempt rights and remedies under the state workmen's compensation
laws, 2 but the Court quickly found this attempt to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the states.88 Five years later, Congress
again tried to amend the Judiciary Act, 4 but once more was rebuffed by
the Court.
Without doubt Congress has the power to alter, amend or re-
vise the maritime law by statutes of general application em-
bodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would
permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or gen-
eral provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may
26. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
27. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 78 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)
(1970)).
28. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31. See, e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wail.) 430 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
32. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
33. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
34. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634.
1972]
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not be delegated to the several States. The grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity; otherwise wide
discretion is left to Congress. 5
Shortly thereafter, in 1927, the original Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act8" was enacted. Under this Act, com-
pensation was 66 2/3 percent of an injured or disabled worker's average
weekly pay, but not to exceed $25.00 per week.87 In 1948 the maximum
recovery was raised to $35.00 per week;8 s in 1954 to $54.00 per week; 9
and in 1961 to $70.00 per week.4° Since 196i there have been no further
increases. The 1972 Amendments at long last remove the static maximum
compensation ceiling in favor of a new maximum to be figured annually
as a function of the national average weekly longshoreman's wage.41 No
longer will maximum disability payments be frozen at unrealistically low
levels due to congressional inactivity. When one views the dismal record
of maximum allowable compensation under the Act, it is no wonder that
third party law suits became a popular vehicle for making an injured
worker "whole," a goal unobtainable under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
III. THE EXTENSION OF THE MARITIME DOCTRINE OF SEAWORTHINESS
TO LONGSHOREMEN AND THE BIRTH OF THE THIRD PARTY CIRCULAR
LIABILITY LAW SUIT UNDER THE ACT
A. The Longshoreman is Protected by the Courts
In 1946, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki 2 extended the maritime doc-
trine of seaworthiness to longshoremen aboard ships afloat in navigable
waters who were injured while performing work traditionally done by
members of the ship's crew, seamen. The doctrine of seaworthiness is an
admiralty doctrine of absolute liability. Under it, a shipowner is bur-
dened by an absolute duty "to furnish a vessel and appurtenances rea-
sonably fit for their intended use."48 Prior to Sieracki, this duty had
only been owed to seamen, the wards of admiralty.
44
At the time of his accident, Joseph Sieracki was employed by an
independent stevedoring contractor to do longshoring work on the S.S.
Robin Sherwood. On December 23, 1942, while Sieracki was aboard the
35. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924).
36. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
37. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 6, 44 Stat. 1426.
38. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 623, § 1, 62 Stat. 602.
39. Act of July 26, 1956, ch. 735, § 1, 70 Stat. 654.
40. Act of July 14, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-87, § 1, 75 Stat. 203, amending 33 U.S.C. § 906(1958).
41. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 5 (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
42. 328 U.S. 89 (1946).
43. See note 15 supra.
44. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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Sherwood, the sky, in the form of a ten ton cargo boom, fell in upon him.
Sieracki was covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, but chose to bring a third party action against the owners
of the Sherwood, alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel. His damages
were stipulated to be $9,500, a strong contrast with the maximum re-
covery of $25 per week plus medical expenses under the then existing
Act.45 The trial court found the accident to have been caused by an un-
seaworthy condition as alleged; a shackle holding the cargo boom had
been defective, making the boom unfit for its intended purpose. Never-
theless, the court stated that the finding of unseaworthiness would not
result in recovery because Sieracki was not a "seaman, nor a member of
the crew of the vessel,"" and therefore no duty was owed him. Never
before had longshoremen been afforded protection under the doctrine of
seaworthiness, and the district court was satisfied to continue its restric-
tion to seamen.
The Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, however, reversed. Instead of
searching for a way to call a longshoreman a seaman, as the district court
had suggested would have to be done, the Third Circuit analyzed the
problem in terms of risk. Concluding that a longshoreman is exposed to
the same risks as a seaman, the court found the doctrine of seaworthi-
ness applicable. 7 It reasoned that to allow an injured longshoreman and
an injured seaman, who stood on the same deck and faced the same
hazards, different recoveries based merely on their job titles would be
preposterous.4 s
The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that seaworthiness "is a form
of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian pol-
icy."'49 The humanitarian policy referred to by the Court is that the
owner of a ship is in a better position to distribute loss from injury
throughout the shipping community than the individual injured:
Accordingly we think the Court of Appeals correctly held
that the liability arises as an incident, not merely of the sea-
man's contract, but of performing the ship's services with the
owner's consent..0
[F]or injuries incurred while working on board the ship in
navigable waters the [longshoreman] is entitled to the seaman's
traditional and statutory protections, regardless of the fact that
he is employed immediately by another than the owner. For
45. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, §§ 6, 7(a), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 906, 907(a)
(1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§ 4, 5(a), 6 (Oct. 27, 1972).
46. Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724, 726 (ED. Pa. 1944).
47. Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1945).
48. Id. at 101. Such a result has been reintroduced, however, by the 1972 Amendments.
Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a) (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
49. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95 (1946).
50. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
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these purposes he is, in short, a seaman because he is doing a
seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards."'
The Supreme Court, then, limited the Court of Appeals' risk in-
terpretation to cover only those longshoremen exposed to the "seaman's
risk," i.e., those longshoremen performing the tasks traditionally per-
formed by seamen. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented from this view,
arguing that the seaman occupies a special place as a ward of admiralty.
Such a status, he reasoned, is not shared by land-based workers. In ad-
dition, Frankfurter could see no social justification in the extension of
3eaworthiness to longshoremen:
The whole philosophy of liability without fault is that losses
which are incidental to socially desirable conduct should be
placed on those best able to bear them. Congress has made a
determination that the employer is best able to bear the loss
which, in this instance, could not be avoided by the exercise of
due care. This is an implied determination which should pre-
clude us from saying that the ship owner is in a more favorable
position to absorb the loss or pass it on to society at large than
the employer."z
B. What the Court Giveth, the Congress Taketh Away I
The argument over seaworthiness which Sieracki started has now,
perhaps, been silenced by the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.es It seems that Justice Frank-
furter's position has been vindicated, since the Amendments abolish
seaworthiness as a remedy for longshoremen injured aboard ship. 4 Why
the stevedoring companies have actively lobbied for this change, when
it would appear that the doctrine of seaworthiness shifted the plaintiff's
attack to the shipowner, is answered by an analysis of Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.55
C. The "Circular Liability" Circle is Completed
The result of Sieracki was increased liability for unseaworthy con-
ditions for which the shipowners were held accountable. Their pocket-
books were sorely taxed and they, in turn, cast about for another party
to relieve them of the financial burden. In Ryan, the Supreme Court
shifted the burden of liability, making the stevedore an indemnitor for
liability arising out of unseaworthy conditions which it had created
aboard ship while loading or unloading under contract with the ship-
51. Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
53. Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct. 27, 1972).
54. Id. § 18(a).
55. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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owner. Ryan Stevedoring Company had loaded the Canton Victory, a
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation ship, at Georgetown, South Carolina.
The loaded vessel thereafter proceeded to Brooklyn, New York, where
Ryan also unloaded it. At the pier in Brooklyn, Frank Palazzolo, a Ryan
employee, was injured while unloading the Canton Victory when im-
properly secured cargo fell on his leg. Palazzolo was covered as a long-
shoreman by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act. Under it he received $2,490 in compensation payments, and
$9,857.36 in medical services. Ryan's insurance carrier was the disburs-
ing agent.
Palazzolo, however, was not satisfied with the payment, and in-
stituted a third party action against Pan-Atlantic, resorting to section 33
of the Act56 and claiming unseaworthiness of the vessel.57 The allegation
was that the improperly stowed cargo made the ship unseaworthy. Palaz-
zolo recovered a $75,000 verdict, from which he reimbursed Ryan's in-
surance carrier for the medical expenses and compensation he had been
paid. In the same action, Pan-Atlantic, owner of the Canton Victory,
filed a third party complaint for indemnity against Ryan, alleging that
the stevedoring company had negligently loaded the vessel in Georgetown.
The trial court dismissed Pan-Atlantic's third party complaint, finding,
inter alia, that Pan-Atlantic was a joint tortfeasor with Ryan and there-
fore precluded from recovery under Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp.,58
which had held against contribution amongst joint tortfeasors in ad-
miralty. The trial court also found that no express warranty of indemnity
existed between the parties. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, re-
versed on this latter point, holding that "Ryan was obligated by implied
contract to perform the work in a reasonably safe manner. This duty
Ryan breached; accordingly, Pan-Atlantic is entitled to indemnity.'"
The Supreme Court affirmed.6
Ryan Stevedoring had argued that its liability was exclusively under
section 5 of the Act:
The liability of an employer . . . [for compensation] shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to re-
cover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death .... 6'
56. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1952) (enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 33, 44 Stat.
1440). The material is currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 92-576, § 15 (Oct. 27, 1972).
57. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1953). This was
the approach used in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See section III, A
supra.
58. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
59. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1954).
60. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952) (enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat.
1972]
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Ryan's argument was predicated on the view that the action was one
sounding in tort. It reasoned that Pan-Atlantic's loss flowed solely from
Palazzolo's injury, and that section 5 of the Act limited the employer's
liability to its employee alone, thereby precluding the third party re-
covery sought by Pan-Atlantic. The Supreme Court, however, based its
holding on contract. The Court reasoned that Pan-Atlantic's claim for
indemnity arose out of Ryan's breach of an implied warranty to perform
its stevedoring services in a safe manner. Looking to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act itself, the Court stated:
Section 5 of the Act expressly excludes the liability of the em-
ployer "to the employee," or others, entitled to recover "on
account of such [employee's] injury or death." Therefore, in
the instant case, it excludes the liability of the stevedoring con-
tractor to its longshoreman, and to his kin, for damages on ac-
count of the longshoreman's injuries. At the same time, how-
ever, § 5 expressly preserves to each employee a right to recover
damages against third persons. It thus preserves the right,
which Palazzolo has exercised, to recover damages from the ship-
owner in the present case. The Act nowhere expressly excludes
or limits a shipowner's right, as a third person, to insure itself
against such a liability either by a bond of indemnity, or the
contractor's own agreement to save the shipowner harmless.
Petitioner's [Ryan's] agreement in the instant case amounts
to the latter for . . . it is a contractual undertaking to stow
the cargo "with reasonable safety" and thus to save the ship-
owner harmless from petitioner's failure to do so. 62
D. What the Court Giveth, the Congress Taketh Away H
The 1972 Amendments to the Act overrule the italicized language
from Ryan quoted above. Section 18 (a) of the Amendments changes sec-
tion 5 of the Act, providing:
[A longshoreman injured on a vessel] may bring an action
against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the pro-
visions of section 33 of this Act, and the employer [stevedore
company] shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages
directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void. . . . The liability of the vessel under
this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of sea-
worthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.
The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of
all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available
under this Act. 8
1426). The material is currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No.
92-576, § 18(a) (Oct. 27, 1972).
62. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129-30 (1956) (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis added).
63. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(b) (Oct. 27, 1972) (emphasis added).
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Sieracki and Ryan have been extended to include various classes of
people and to cover many situations. Their progeny will not be discussed
here, however, as the 1972 Amendments vitiate that line of decisions.
The two major cases were analyzed here to highlight the changes in the
Act. They also reveal the political and economic forces which clashed
head-on in the forging of the 1972 Amendments.
IV. THE VALUE OF RECOVERY IN A THIRD PARTY ACTION
VERSUS THE VALUE OF THE COMPENSATION REMEDY
A. Elements of the Actions
Both the doctrine of seaworthiness and the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provide a species of liability with-
out fault. To recover for unseaworthiness an injured party need only
prove: (1) that he is a party to whom the shipowner owes the duty of
making the vessel and its appurtenances reasonably safe; (2) that the
duty was breached; and (3) that the individual seeking recovery suffered
injury on account of that breach.64 The duty to maintain a seaworthy
vessel is absolute.65 Thus, fault is not a requisite for recovery, as unsea-
worthiness need not be the result of negligence. The concept of fault is
also absent from the Longshoremen's Act; section 4(b) states: "Com-
pensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the in-
jury." 6 The injury under the Act must be job related. 7
The desirability of unseaworthiness, as opposed to ordinary negli-
gence, as the basis of the longshoreman's suit against a third party
defendant shipowner is obvious. The burden of proof in negligence is
much greater. The injured plaintiff must prove knowledge of the injury-
producing defect on the part of the responsible party in order to establish
liability. Such a burden is difficult enough in ordinary cases where the
defendant is stationary. The same burden becomes almost intolerable in
the maritime setting because both the place of injury (the ship), and the
parties at fault (the crew) may depart for long voyages shortly after an
accident. Furthermore, as much of American shipping is done on foreign
hulls, the guilty vessel may never return. The expense and difficulty of
preparing a case based on negligence could very well be overwhelming.
Yet the 1972 Amendments abolish seaworthiness as a theory available to
longshoremen, leaving only negligence: "The liability of the vessel under
64. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Sieracki v. Seas Shipping
Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
65. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1970) (enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 4(b), 44
Stat. 1426).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§ 2, 3, 5, 15, 18, 20
(Oct. 27, 1972) (enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 2(2), 44 Stat. 1425).
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this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness
or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.""'
B. The Value of Recovery Under the Act
The difference in the value of recovery between compensation and
third party practice, found in contrasting the measure of recovery for
each, is the "gut issue" which had forestalled improvements in the Act
for many years. 9 The main elements of recovery under the Act are
medical expenses plus compensation payments for a portion of wages
lost during the existence of a condition which prevented the injured party
from working. Since the inception of the Act, the compensation portion of
recovery has been 66 2/3 percent of the injured's average weekly wage,
subject to a maximum payment, the most recent being $70.00 per week.7"
In an industry in which wages have steadily increased over the last eleven
years, the $70.00 figure had become tragically inadequate. For example,
Secretary of Labor Hodgson testified that the 1972 average weekly wage
for longshoremen was $184.00 in Boston and New York.71 However, it
should be emphasized that the quoted $184.00 figure was only the average
in those two ports; many workers make much more in weekly wages,
depending upon their skills and jobs. Longshoremen who handle ex-
plosives or general cargo earned weekly wages of $328.80 in the Port of
New York during 1970;2 to them $70.00 is a drop in the bucket of
financial need.
The 1972 Amendments provide for a liberalized recovery ceiling
which varies with yearly changes in industry wage levels.73 The standard
is still 66 2/3 percent of the worker's average weekly wage, but the
maximum payment has been greatly upgraded from $70.00 per week:
[C]ompensation for disability shall not exceed the following
percentages of the applicable national average weekly wage as
determined by the Secretary under paragraph (3):
(A) 125 per centum or $167, whichever is greater, during the
period ending September 30, 1973.
(B) 150 per centum during the period beginning October .1,
1973, and ending September 30, 1974.
(C) 175 per centum during the period beginning October 1,
1974, and ending September 30, 1975.
68. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a) (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970)
(emphasis added).
69. See S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 906-08 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct. 27, 1972) (en-
acted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, §§ 6-8, 44 Stat. 1426-29).
71. Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1972).
72. Id. at 99.
73. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 5(a)(3) (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
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(D) 200 per centum beginning October 1, 1975."'
The legislative purpose behind greater compensation is to raise "benefits
to a level commensurate with present day salaries and with the needs
of injured workers whose sole support will be payments under the Act."75
C. The Value of Recovery in a Third Party Suit
Inadequate benefits under the old Act forced injured longshoremen
into a legal battle of economic survival. In port cities such as New York
where living expenses are high, $70.00 per week did not go very far.
Third party suits bridged the gap with a more liberal damage measure.
The elements of recovery in such suits are: (1) Actual wages lost; (2)
Physical pain and suffering; (3) Impairment of future earning capacity;
(4) Medical expenses; (5) Future physical pain and suffering; and
(6) Mental pain and suffering.76 Many of these elements are the same
as those required under the Act; 77 but, the difference in recovery had
been great in actual experience because the consciences of the court and
the jury are the only limiting factors. A good example of this difference
was seen in Ryan, where Frank Palazzolo collected $12,797.36 under
the Compensation Act, and $75,000 in his third party action. It is
assumed that a third party negligence action will result in similar re-
coveries under the 1972 Amendments' version of the third party action,
now limited to negligence.
D. Comparative Negligence
The 1972 Amendments limit third party actions to negligence for
injuries sustained aboard ship. The Senate committee's report indicates
that the legislative intent was to place the longshoreman injured aboard a
vessel
in the same position he would be in if he were injured in non-
maritime employment ashore, insofar as bringing a third party
damage action is concerned, and not to endow him with any
special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under
whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as "sea-
worthiness", "nondelegable duty", or the like.78
Despite its desire to place the longshoreman in the same position in
74. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 5(a) (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
75. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
76. See NoRMis, MARITINE PERSONAL INJURIES § 53 (2d ed. 1966).
77. Medical expenses and wage compensation were discussed in section IV, B supra.
Additional compensation is paid under the Act for permanent partial disability; a differential
is paid for temporary partial disability, not exceeding 5 years, which results in decreased
earning capacity. 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92,-576, §§ 5(c), 7, 9,
20(a) (Oct. 27, 1972) (enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 8, 44 Stat. 1427).
78. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
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which he would be if injured ashore, the committee saved the admiralty
version of contributory negligence-the less harsh doctrine of compara-
tive negligence:
[T]he Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy
authorized in the bill shall be applied differently in different
ports depending on the law of the State in which the port may be
located. The Committee intends that legal questions which may
arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall
be determined as a matter of Federal law. In that connection,
the Committee intends that the admiralty concept of compara-
tive negligence . . . shall apply . . . . Also, the Committee
intends that the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of
"assumption of risk" . . . shall also be applicable.7 9
V. THE PROBLEM AROUND THE CORNER-FEDERAL LAW OR STATE LAW
IN THIRD PARTY ACTIONS BY PERSONS ON THE DOCK?
Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the Act covered only those workers
who were employed upon the navigable waters of the United States or
in dry docks.8 0 At times, however, longshoremen working on the dock
would receive a ship-related injury there, such as cargo falling from
a crane aboard the ship. Borderline cases such as these created a
"twilight zone" in which the question was whether the Act applied.8 A
workman injured on the dock independent of anything to do with the
vessel was covered by state law. The Amendments, however, change
this by bringing longshoremen on the dock under their protective
umbrella:
Sec. 3(a) Compensation shall be payable under this Act in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building, way, marine railway,
or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in load-
ing, unloading, repairing or building a vessel) 2
The intent, however, is not to cover all employees in the above enumer-
79. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(c) (Oct. 27, 1972).
81. Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone in which the
employees must have their rights determined case by case, and in which particular
facts and circumstances are vital elements.
Id. at 256.
The extension of the act also should end the "maritime but local" controversy spawned
by Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
82. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(c) (Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970)
(enacted as Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 3(a) 44 Stat. 1426).
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ated areas, but only those "engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel."88
The new problem which arises from this expanded coverage is the
choice of law in third party actions brought by workers injured on the
docks against those causing the injuries. In the author's opinion, federal
and not state law must be applicable. The expressed intent of the Senate
committee in expanding coverage was to "promote uniformity;" 84 the
committee did not want compensation left up to the states. Similarly, it
could be said that resort to state law on third party shoreside claims
would prevent uniformity. The interpretation of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act from Jensen5 onward has
emphasized uniformity. Application of state law would run counter to
the reason for which the Act was created: "The necessary consequence
would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime
matters which the Constitution was designed to establish."8"
The Senate committee called for uniformity vis-h-vis accidents
aboard ship, stating that it intended federal law to apply to third party
negligence claims arising therefrom. 7 It would therefore seem only
proper that the same law be applied to accidents on the docks. The
ramifications of this prediction remain to be seen, but the application,
for example, of comparative negligence, rather than contributory negli-
gence, to a shoreside third party action would allow for recovery where
recovery would not previously have been available in a state adhering
to the contributory negligence doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objects of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act are:
1. To increase benefits under the Act. 8
2. To make the stevedore-employer's sole liability the obligation
to provide compensation and benefits under the Act. 9
3. To make the vessel liable only for its own negligence. 90
4. To eliminate hold-harmless or indemnity agreements between
stevedore and vessel.91
83. S. REP,. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972).
84. Id.
85. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
86. Id. at 217.
87. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
88. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972); see Pub. L. No. 92-576,
5 S & 7 (Oct. 27, 1972).
89. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); see Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a)
(Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
90. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
91. S. REP. No. 92-1125. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
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5. To extend the Act to shoreside areas. 2
The success of the legislation in meeting these goals remains to be
seen in its treatment by the courts. It is clear, however, that the increased
benefits will dampen judicial eagerness to evade the Act, which may once
again be a viable piece of social legislation.
92. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972) ; see Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(a)
(Oct. 27, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 902 (1970).
